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PRE-OPERATING EXPENSES AND SECTION 174:
WILL SNOW FALL?
John W. Lee

'~

Section 174 permits a taxpayer to elect a current deduction for research
or experimental expenditures paid or incurred by him during the taxable year "in connection with his trade or business." Expenditures to
develop new products unrelated to existing product lines of a trade
or business may qualify.' But for over a decade the Tax Court and
lower federal courts have interpreted section 174 to require that the
taxpayer be engaged in a going trade or business." In Snow v. Commissioner 3 the Tax Court and Sixth Circuit recently held that the going
trade or business requirement is not met unless the taxpayer holds himself out to others as providing goods or services. Under this view, there
would be no deduction for expenditures for research and development
( "R & D") that is undertaken when the taxpayer is just beginning his
operation and does not have any products to sell. Thus, a small enterprise undertaking R & D for its first invention, which is unrelated to
any mainline trade or business, would not be entitled to a section 174
deduction, but a venture already engaged in the business of experimentation and development of new products, i.e., inventing or general
business, would be able to deduct R & D expenditures for new products
even though not related to current product lines or manufacturing
processes.
In Snow the taxpayer was a limited partner in three partnerships each
of which was formed to carry on R & D for a particular invention. In
addition to investing in the partnerships, the taxpayer rendered advisory
and management services to them. By 1966, the tax year at issue, two
of the partnerships had developed their inventions to the stage of being
ready for sale, and one of these partnerships had in fact applied for a
patent. The third partnership was just beginning its operations in 1966
and could not offer to sell any of its products during the year. It had no
patent issued or pending on its invention (a trash burner), nor did it
have income from the sale of licenses or any other source. On these
*John W. Lee (A.B., North Carolina, 1965; LL.B, Virginia, 1968; LL.M., Georgetown, 1970) is a member of the Virginia and North Carolina bars, and is associated
with the firm of Hirschler and Fleischer, Richmond, Virginia.
1 Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277 (1973); Rev. Rul. 71-162, 1971-1 C.B. 97.
2
John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 ( 1961); accol'd, Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d
326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968) (existing trade or business); William Tiffin Downs, 49
T.C. 533, 540 (1968); Martin Mayrath, 41 T.C. 582 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir. 1966); Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277, 1279 ( 1973); Charles H. Schafer,
23 TCM 927 (1964).
3
482 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 1973 ), rel'l. )!,l'anted, 94 S. Ct. 846 (Jan. 7, 1974)
(No. 73-641).
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facts, the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit held that the third partnership
was not engaged in any trade or business, including that of inventing
or development of inventions, so that there was no trade or business
for its 1966 R & D expenditures to be paid in connection with. 4 The
Circuit Court further concluded that the taxpayer-limited partner's investment activities in the three partnerships were not sufficiently continuous
or regular to represent his engaging in a trade or business, and that
under Whipple v. Commi.r.rioner" the furnishing of managerial services
did not constitute a trade or business. Accordingly, it held that the
1966 R & D expenditures were not paid in connection with the limited
partner's business either."
The Surireme Court has granted certiorari in Snow. The case presents
four distinct issues upon which the Supreme Court's decision could rest:
( 1) Whether section 174 requires a distinction between trade or
business expenses and expenses preparatory to engaging in a trade
or business;
( 2) Whether the trade or business concept includes a requirement
of holding one's self out to others as providing goods or services;
( 3) Whether the trade or business of a partnership is imputed to a
limited partner, and, if so, whether that treatment affects the character
of the partner's activities in another separate partnership; and
( 4) Whether a tax shelter motive should affect the timing or deductibility of expenses.
SECTION 174 AND PREPARATORY EXPENSES
Prior to 1926, the regulations permitted the optional expensing or
capitalization of expenditures for experiments intended to improve
facilities or products. 7 In 1925, however, the Board of Tax Appeals
ruled in Gilliam Manllfactllring Co." that amounts expended to acquire
patents were capital expenditures and that a taxpayer had no option to
deduct them currently. Accordingly, the Treasury deleted the option
from the regulations in 1926." The Internal Revenue Service continued
generally to permit taxpayers to deduct expenditures paid in connection
with regular and continual research activities, 10 but on those unpredict·• Edwin A. Snow, 58 T.C. 585, 597 ( 1972); a/J' d -182 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir.
1973).
" 373 u.s. 193, 202-03 ( 1963).
" -182 F.2d 1029, 103-1 (6th Cir. 1973).
7 Article 168 of Treas. Reg. -15, 62 and 65; Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C.
321, 313 (1955).
s 1 B.T.A. 967, 970 ( 1925).
"Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 321, 3'i'i ( 1955).
10 Address by Commissioner of Internal Revenue Dunlap, to the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation on April -1, 1952, 5 CCH 1952 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
1f 6170 [hereinafter cited as Address by Commissioner Dunlap]. See Swanson, Tax
Treatment of Research and Exfm·imentation Exf>enditure.r, 3-1 TAXES 511 ( 1956)
[hereinafter cited as Swanson].
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able occasions when it challenged such deductions the court approved the
disallowance. 11 For instance, Goodell-Pratt Co./ 2 an early Board of
Tax Appeals decision frequently relied upon in such cases, reasoned that
R & D expenditures must be capitalized because " [ t} hey were expended
expressly for the purpose of increasing the earning capacity of the enterprise in acquiring something of permanent use in the business." 13 In
1951, Representative Camp, a member of the House Ways and Means
Committee, inserted in the Congressional Record a summary explanation
of a Proposed Revenue Revision Act of 19 51 submitted by the American
Bar Association. That explanation, in describing a provision quite similar to section 17 4, stated as follows:
In order to clarify the existing confusion in respect to the tax treatment of such expenditures, and to prevent tax discrimination between large businesses having continuous programs of research and
small or beginning business enterprises, Section 154 provides generally that expenditures made in industrial or commercial research
and development or improvement of industrial or commercial products, service or processes may, at the election of the taxpayer, be
deducted as expenses or capitalized and charged off over a period
selected and designated by the taxpayer. 14
The House and Senate Committee reports on the 1954 Code recognized
the uncertainty in the existing law and made clear that the purpose of
section 174 was jointly to eliminate the uncertainty and to encourage
taxpayers to carry on research and experimentation/ 5 by allowing them
the election of either a current deduction or a deferred deduction of
R & D expenditures until the invention is first put to an incomeproducing use, followed thereafter by amortization of such deferred
expenditures over a sixty-month period. (If no election for deduction
or sixty-month amortization were made, the taxpayer would capitalize
the full amount of the expenditure and presumably amortize it over
the useful life of any resulting invention, provided that such life was
determinable, or deduct it as a loss incurred in a transaction entered into
for profit when the project was abandoned.) 16 The Chairmen of the
11 Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co., 25 T.C. 321, 343 (1955); accord, Ward v. United
States, 32 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Mass. 1940); Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., 12
T.C. 760 (1949), alf'd, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950); Claude Neon Lights, Inc. 35
B.T.A. 424, 442 ( 193 7). Senator Millikin, in introducing section 174 of the 1954
Code to the Senate stated that the "tax laws take a curiously cold and unpredictable
attitude toward such expenses." 100 CoN G. REC. 8998 ( 1954).
1z 3 B.T.A. 30 ( 1925).
13 Id. at 36.
14 97 CONG. REC. A4326 ( 1951) (remarks of Representative Camp) (Appendix).
15 H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., 28 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.
2d Sess., 33 (1954).
16 Swanson, suj1ra note 10, at 542. Recent developments, particularly Harris W.
Seed, 52 T.C. 880 (1969), have settled that a taxpayer is entitled to an abandonment"
loss as to pre-operating expenses as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit under
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Congressional tax committees repeated in their explanations of section
174 to their respective Houses of Congress that it was intended to
eliminate the competitive disadvantage under the current law to small
businesses that attempted to develop new products without established
research programs since they were frequently not permitted to deduct
their expenses, unlike large and well-established competitors with expansive regular research budgetsY
In 1961, the Tax Court ruled in John F. Koom 18 that the term
"trade or business" in section 174 was used in the sense of a "going"
trade or business. The taxpayer in Koon.r had contracted with a research
laboratory that was to develop an invention, then in a primitive state,
to the stage of commercial acceptance. The court held that development
activity of this type was preliminary to the existence of a trade or business of the taxpayer and that section 174 applied only to R & D expenditures made in connection with an existing trade or business, i.e.,
expenditures for development or improvement of existing products or
services or development of new products or services in connection with
an existing business. Ironically, the facts in Koon.r are virtually identical
to those in Hart-Bartlett-SturteMnt Grain Co., 10 a 1939 Code decision
which Koon.r recognized as one of the line of cases treating R & D as
capital expenditures, a result which section 174 was intended in alleviate.
The Tax Court in Koon.r looked to the decisions under section 162
on business investigation ~" and concluded that expenditures made in
investigating a potential business or preparatory to entering into a business were not made in connection with an existing trade or business, and
hence were not deductible. 21 Business investigation expenses consist of
costs incurred in investigation of a prospective business prior to reaching
a firm decision whether to acquire it. 2 ~ These expenditures are commonly distinguished from pre-operating expenses (also called start-up
or pre-opening costs), which are paid during the time between the
decision to establish or acquire a new business and the beginning of
actual business operations. 2 ~ The term usually refers to expenses which
would be currently deductible if they had been incurred after business
operations had begun in full flower. Typical examples of pre-operating
section 165(c) (2) provided that "the taxpayer be committed-at least mentally, if not
legally-to the accomplishment of the business venture." Wilberding, An Indiz,idua/'s Business Investigation Expenses: An Argument Supportill?. Deductibility, 26
TAX LAWYER 219, 241 ( 1973) [hereinafter cited as Wilberding}.
17 100 CoNG. REC. 3425 (1954) (remarks of Representative Reed); 100 CONG.
REC. 8998 (1954) (remarks of Senator Millikin).
1s 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 ( 1961).
to 12 T.C. 760 (1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950).
20 Discussed infra in text accompanying notes 71-77.
21 3 5 T.C. 1092, 1100 ( 1961).
22 1 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. \11332.1325.
23 See United States v. Richmond Television Corp., 345 F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir.),
11acated and remanded per curiam 011 other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965).
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expenses are costs of advertising and promotion, training of employees,
lining up suppliers and potential customers or distributors, and legal
and accounting services in setting up books and records. 24 Expenditures
for R & D, although capital, are pre-operating and not investigatory
expenditures. Distinctions analogous to investigatory, pre-operating, and
operating expenses also exist in the areas of farming 25 and mining. 26
The Sixth Circuit in Snow relied heavily on the landmark Fourth
Circuit decision in Richmond Television Corp. 27 The Richmond Televi.rion case arose under section 162 and was the first rna jor decision to
extend the investigation precedents to the pre-operating stage of an
enterprise (while recognizing that the problems were not identical),
thereby requiring capitalization of start-up costs. It also laid the
foundation for government reliance, when advocating application of a
preparatory to engaging in a trade or business doctrine, on the definition
of a trade or business as "holding one's self out to others as engaged in
selling." Mr. Justice Frankfurter first offered this definition in his
concurring opinion in Dep11ty F. D11Pont/ 8 an investor expense case
arising prior to the enactment of the predecessor of section 212. The
Sixth Circuit in Snow noted that the Tax Court below had applied the
term trade or business "as that phrase had been construed at the time
2 ·1 1 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. 1]1332.1325; Erbacher, Start-up Costs: Are
They Deductible by a Corporation for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 48 TAXES -188
(1970).
25 Preparatory expenses (typically clearing, leveling or conditioning land, planting
trees, installing irrigation systems) which are incurred prior to raising agricultural commodities in order to begin the growing process must be capitalized. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.180-1(b). Developmental expenditures are incurred so that the growing process once
commenced, may continue in the desired manner. The taxpayer may expense or capitalize such expenditures at his option. The productive stage is reached when the farm
becomes a fullfledged operating business. Preparatory expenses can never be deducted,
and developmental expenses can no longer be capitalized after the productive stage is
met. Developmental expenditures like start-up costs are expenses that if incurred after
the enterprise becomes fully operative are currently deductible.
26 Exploratory expenditures correspond to investigatory expenditures, consisting of
expenditures for the purpose of ascertaining the existence, location, extent of quality
of ore and mineral deposits. I.R.C. §§ 616, 617. Developmental expenditures correspond to pre-operating expenses and agricultural developmental expenditures because
after the mine reaches the "producing" or full operating stage similar expenditures such
as the costs of shafts, tunnels, etc. required to maintain the output of the mine are
currently deductible. Alexander & Grant, Mine Det,elopment and Exp/orati011 Expenditures, 8 TAX. L. REV., 401, 403, 409 ( 1953) [hereinafter cited as Alexander &
Grant). Prior to the Revenue Act of 1951, both exploration and development expenditures had to be capitalized. ld. at 403. Thereafter both could be deducted
subject to complex recapture or recoupment and limitation rules applicable to exploratory expenditures. See l.R.C. of 1939 § 23(ff); I.R.C. §§ 615, 617. Developmental expenditures, also described as operating expenses, S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 188 (1969), have also been deductible since 1951 without limitation
or recapture. I.R.C. of 1939 § 23(cc); I.R.C. § 616. The parallel between development costs and R&D was noticed early on. Alexander & Grant, supra at 409.
2 7 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965), t:arated and 1·emanded per curiam on other
grou11ds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965).
2 8 308 u.s. 488, 499 (1940).
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of the Congressional enactment of Section 174." 29 It concluded that
the above-quoted comments by Representative Camp could not set aside
such "settled interpretation" of trade or business as used in section
174. 30 Similarly, the Tax Court in Koons had read the Committee
Reports relating to section 162 as manifesting approval of this doctrine." 1
The legislative history to section 162 relied upon by the court in
Koons establishes that in fact the 1954 Code concept of a trade or busi·
ness did not differ from the 19 39 Code concept. 32 Surveying the relevant
business expense cases decided prior to the 1954 Code reveals that none
of them relied upon the taxpayer's failure to hold himself out to others
as a seller, nor had they established any going trade or business test which
would preclude deduction of pre-operating expenses."" Indeed, virtually
none of these decisions, including the landmark Morton Frank decision, 3 '1
involved pre-operating expenses, but rather dealt only with investigatory
expenses incurred prior to a firm decision to enter into a particular business. 3 '' A possible exception, Mid-State ProdHcts Co., 36 involving, in
29

482 F.2d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1032. Strangely, the Sixth Circuit did not mention the remarks of Representative Reed, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, who also noted the
(discriminatory) tax preference given to "large and well-established competitors" as to
deduction of R & D in his presentation of the 1954 Code to the House. 100 CoNG.
REC. 3425 (1954). The taxpayer cited both the 1951 and 1954 legislative history to
the Court. Brief for Appellant at 33, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973).
The point is brought out very clearly in the comments of Senator Millikin in introducing the 1954 Code to the Senate, 100 CONG. REc. 8998 ( 1954):
Many large businesses with regular research and experimental budgets have as
a practical matter been able to secure the current deduction of most of these
expenses. Many small businesses, however, which have not been able to afford
a large regular budget for research have been at a disadvantage because of
uncertainties concerning the deductibility of their expenditures. . . . The
bill corrects this impediment by providing a definite option for the taxpayer to deduct such expenses or to capitalize them and write them off over
a period of not less than 5 years.
:n 35 T.C. 1099 (1961) (citiug S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33
(1954).
32 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A43 ( 1943); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 ( 1954).
3 3 See, e.g., Mid-State Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 696 (1954) (promulgated on February 15)
acquiesced iu, 1955·2 ·c.s. 7; Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332, 343-44 (1953), acquiesced in, 1956-1 C.B. 6; aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); Morton Frank, 20 T.C.
511 (1953); George C. Westervelt, 8 T.C 1248, 1254 (1947); RobertS. Seese, 7 T.C.
925, 927 (1946); James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603, 605 (1944); Benjamin Miggins, 8
TCM 82 (1949).
3 4 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
35 See Fleischer, The Tax Treatment of Expenses Incurred in llwestigation for a
BusinesJ· or CafJital lntJestmmt, I;( TAX L. REV. 567 ( 1959) [hereinafter cited as
Fleischer}.
36 21 T.C. 696, 714-17 (1954) (decided on February 15, 1945). This decision
could be classified as both an investigatory and pre-operating expense decision. Investigation for expansion into a related manufacturing venture began halfway through
taxpayer's fiscal year ending November 30. Around September 15 after an option on
another production facility lapsed, taxpayer acquired a lease and began remodeling.
Production contracts and special war-time permits were acquired by the middle of Octo30
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part, pre-operating expenditures as well as investigatory expenditures,
was handed down three weeks prior to the publication of the House
Report on the 1954 Code. Mid-State Prod11ct.r rested on Goodell-Pratt
Co.'s theory that expenses which were intended to increase earning power
must be capitalized and not on the theory based upon a failure to hold
one's self out as a seller. Significantly, Goodell-Pratt was also relied
upon by most of the pre-1954 R & D decisions which section 174
was intended to overrule.'" Frank, too, has been analyzed by subsequent
decisions as being based upon this reasoning." 8 In short, the Sixth Circuit
would have Congress in 1954 intending to incorporate into section 174
a theory under section 162 that was simply not present or "settled" in
the then-existing cases. The court's error was no doubt induced in part
by the case-law use of the term "preparatory expenses" to describe both
business investigation expenses and pre-operating expenses. Clarity
would have been attained more easily had the term "preparatory expenses" been limited to investigatory expenditures and pre-operating
costs been categorized as "development expenditures."
What then was the Congressional intent in incorporating a trade or
business requirement into section 17 4? It is submitted that Congress only
contemplated imposition of profit motive and continuity requirementsthat the R & D activities must be carried on with an expectation of
economic return as an end product of the R & 0, 3 " and that the taxpayer
must devote a substantial portion of his time to the activities or there
must have been extensive or repeated activity over a substantial period of
ber. Production began in December with the first deliveries in January. The taxpayer
initially charged the expenditures at issue (consisting of salaries, travel expenses, telephone, office supplies, etc.) to a "deferred development and pre-operating expense
account," and capitalized them. The Tax Court disallowed the taxpayer's later attempts
to deduct the expenses, which it agreed were usually currently deductible on the
grounds that they increased the taxpayer's earning capacity by setting up a new business and because the costs were "more nearly comparable to the costs of surveys preliminary to the organization of any business corporation or venture" and hence were
preliminary to entry into the new business. 21 T.C. 7 H. 716-17. It is submitted that
at least under the rationale of York v. Comm"r, 261 F.2d -·121 (-lth Cir. 1958), the
expenses were deductible as ordinary and necessary to the existing, related business.
The increase in earning capacity rationale is criticized at note 53 infra.
:n See, e.~;., Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co .. 12 T.C. 760, 766 (19-19). aff'd, 182
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1950); Hazeltine Corp., 32 B.T.A. 110, 122 (1935), aff'd, 89
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 193 7); John F. Canning, 29 B.T.A. 99. I 07 ( 1933), (l(quie.rced
in, XIII-I C.B. 3; Forest Prods. Chern. Co .. 27 B.T.A. 638. 6<!1 (1933). a((tuie.rced in.
XII-1 C. B. 5, aff' d, Dec. 18, 193·1 (6th Cir.).
as See, e.g., Robert J. Wallendal, 31 T.C. 12·19, 1251 ( 1959); Miron Kroyt, 20
TCM 1665,1668 (1961).
30 See, e.g., Mayrath v. Comm'r, 357 F.2d 209. 212 (5th Cir. 1966); William
Tiffin Downs, -19 T.C. 533, 5-10 (1968), acquie.rced in, 1968-2 C.B. 2; Industrial Research Prods., Inc., -10 T.C. 578, 590 ( 1963), acquie.rad in, 1966-1 C. B. 2; Eugene J.
Magee, 32 TCM 1277 (1973); Johan A. Louw, 30 TCM H21 (1971); Nicholas A.
Dodich, 30 TCM 248 ( 1971); Joe H. Cunningham, 27 TCM 1219 ( 1968); Myron
E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557, 560 (1967); Charles R. Rhoades, 23 TCM 2056 (196·1);
Charles H. Schafer, 23 TCM 927 (1964); Ervin G. Bailey, 22 TCM 1255 (1963).
Tax Ldu•J-er, Vol. 27, No. 3
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time. 40 As the Fifth Circuit noted in Stanton tJ. Commissioner, 41 Congress
was probably attempting to correlate the tax treatment of the cost of
producing a given type of income with the tax character of the income
produced. 42 In short, it did not want a taxpayer to take a current ordinary
deduction for his R & D expenditures under section 174 and then
later rely on the arguments frequently made under the 1939 Code, i.e.,
that any gain on the sale of his invention or process produced by the
R & D was entitled to capital gains treatment because his development of
the property was a hobby '' 3 or that his activities were sufficiently sporadic
so that he did not hold the property for sale to customers in the course
of a trade or business. 44 In none of the significant 1939 Code cases did
the inventors seeking capital gains treatment rely upon a failure to hold
one's self out as providing goods or services.''"
With the exception of Koons, which introduced under section 174
the concept of expenses preparatory to engaging in a trade or business,
and Snow, which turned solely on a failure to hold one's self out as
providing goods or services, all of the noteworthy section 174 and related
section 162 cases decided adversely to the taxpayer could have been
decided on a profit motive or a continuity basis. 46 In fact most were
decided on such bases, at least in the alternative. Moreover, a recent
Tax Court opinion explains both Koom and Mayrath, the landmark Tax
Court R & D decisions prior to Snow, as resting on a continuity theory, 47
which was the usual determinative factor in the pre-1954 Code capital
gains cases. 48
According to the statement of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation on April 4, 1952,
4 0 Stanton v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1968); Martin Mayrath, 41 T.C.
582, 591 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1966); Industrial Research Prods., Inc.,
40 T.C. 578, 589 (1963), acquiesced in, 1966-1 C.B. 2; Johan A. Louw, 30 TCM 1421
( 1971); Myron E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557 ( 1967).
41 399 F.2d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1968).
42 The fact that section 1235 provides for capital gain treatment for the sale of
patents under some circumstances is not inconsistent with this conclusion.
43 See, e.g., Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153, 162 ( 1948); Harold T. Avery, 47
B.T.A. 538, 541 (1942).
4·1 See Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Beach v.
Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2
U.S.T.C. 1[9428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Evans v. Kavanagh, 86 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D.
Mich. 1949), aff'd, 188 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1951); Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258
( 1946). See generally Mann, Capital Asset Status of Patents and lm;entions Under
Generall.R.C. Sections 1221-1223,42 TAXES 317,318-20 (1964).
45 See Comm'r v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
619 ( 1939), and numerous authorities cited therein.
4G See decisions cited in notes 39 and 40 supra.
47 Oliver B. Kilroy, 32 TCM 27, 29 ( 1973).
•s See, e.g., Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947); Comm'r v.
Boeing, 106 F.2d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 619 (1939) (numerous "continuity" authorities cited therein); Snell v. Comm'r, 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir.
1938).
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the Service at that time permitted large research laboratories and businesses with continuing R & D programs to expense R & D on the theory
that over a period of years the expensing of numerous projects would
"not appear to create a materially different tax result from the capitalization of all such items and the later allowance of deductions for abandoned
or worthless projects . . . and the allowance of depreciation on successful ones . . . . " .,, Materially different tax results would obtain, however, when small or beginning businesses first begin to deduct R & D
expenses of a single project, and in such circumstances the Service was
apparently hesitant to allow the deduction of R & D expenses. For as
Representative Reed, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
pointed out in addressing the House during consideration of the 1954
Code:
[V)ery often, under present law, small businesses which are developing new products and do not have established research departments are not allowed to deduct these expenses despite the fact that
their large and well-established competitors can obtain the deduction . . . . [Section 174) will be particularly valuable to small and
growing businesses." 0

Currently, deductions are permitted under section 174 for R & D
which in itself does not constitute a "going business" where a corporation is seeking to develop a new product unrelated to its past line of
products. Thus, expenses of a continuing R & D program of a large
business, or of any established business, come within section 174." 1
Conseguently, the Snow decision resurrects the discrimination against
beginning businesses that section 174 was in large part intended to
prevent.
The above disc.ussion establishes that at the time of the Congressional
enactment of section 174 cases had not yet "settled" whether the prepara·
tory to engaging in a business concept applied to pre-operating expenses
as well as business investigation expenses, nor had they justified that
concept on the argument that a taxpayer had to hold himself out as a
seller to be engaged in trade or business. Thus, neither the opinion of
the Tax Court nor the appellate decision in Snow were founded upon
Address by Commissioner Dunlap, sufJra note 10.
100 CONG. REC. 3425 ( 1954); accord, 100 CONG. REC. 8998 ( 1954) (remarks of
Senator Millikin).
" 1 In Best Universal Lock Co., -15 T.C. 1, 9·10 (1965), acquiesced in, 1966-2 C.B.
1, the Court held that the corporate taxpayer had a continuing history of experimentation and efforts to develop new products and these projects were an integral part of
its trade or business, so that section 174 covered its R & D expenses in developing a
new product unrelated to its past line of products. Cf. York v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421
(4th Cir. 1958). Rev. Rul. 71-162, 1971-1 C.B. 97, does not appear, however, to
limit the availability of section 174 as to development of new products or processes
unrelated to current product lines or manufacturing processes to corporate taxpayers
with established research departments, as was the case in Best Unit1ersa/ Lock.
40

GO

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 27, No. 3

390

SECTION OF TAXATION

any pre-1954 construction of the phrase trade or business, despite the
claims of the Sixth Circuit. In any event, such an approach to statutory
construction seems too narrow. If the post-19 54 developments under
section 162 properly deny trade or business status to a pre-operating venture because it has no goods or services to sell, then the same restrictions
are likely to be applied to section 174 regardless of Congress' intent in
1954. Otherwise, the meaning of terms taken from one statutory provision and incorporated into another would be forever frozen as of the
time of incorporation."" It is submitted, however, that a lack of a current product or service to offer should not preclude attainment of trade
or business status under either section 162 or 174. Furthermore, the
other justifications raised from time to time in the cases to support the
application of the preparatory doctrine to pre-operating expenses are
equally invalid.""
" 2 Certainly judicial construction of statutes "demands, on occasions, the projection
of their expressed purpose to situations not precisely in the minds of those who enacted them." Warren R. Miller, Sr., 51 T.C. 755, 761 (1969). Freezing "trade or
business" in section 171 as of 1951 is hardly consistent with this principle. Nevertheless, incorporation of a statutory phrase into another provision "calls for practical and
sensible interpretation in fitting the provisions of the adopted statute into the scheme
of the adopting one." Id. A strong argument may be made that incorporation of the
preparatory doctrine with its discrimination between businesses with existing research
departments and beginning businesses and its remedy of capitalization is not consistent
with the purposes of section 171. In essence, although not articulated in these terms,
this was the principal argument made by the taxpayer in Snow to the Sixth Circuit and
raised in the application for certiorari. The taxpayer conceded that the "preparatory"
versus "existing" test was logical and proper in terms of the "ordinary and necessary"
requirement of section 162, but asserted that it was illogical as applied to R & D under
section 171, which presupposes a product which is not yet in a marketable condition.
Brief for Appellant at 39-40, Snow v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973). cert .
.~ranted, 91 S. Ct. 816 (Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 73-M1); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
at 10-11. In his reply brief, the taxpayer relined his argument,, maintaining that the
holding one's self out doctrine was derived from the verb "to carry on" which was
not used in section 17-1. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, Snow v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d
1029 (6th Cir. 1973), eM. granted, 9-1 S. Ct. 816 (Jan. 7, 1971) (No. 73-611); act'ord, Petition for a Writ, suJira.
""The other major rationale is that pre-operating expenses must be capitalized because
they increase future earning power and thereby provide benefits to future years. MidState Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 696, 7H ( 195-1). This reasoning is contradicted by the
advertising cases, .ree notes 159-6if infra and accompanying text, and its conceptual basis
was fatally eroded by the Supreme Court's rejection in Comm'r v. Lincoln Savings &
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 315, 35-1 (1971 ), of the "future benefit" definition of capital
expenditures. The Government's frequent reliance on absence of gross receipts, Brief
for Respondent at 35, Edwin A. Snow, 58 T.C. 585 (1972); Brief for Appellant at 12,
Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 3-15 F.2d 901 ( -1th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellant, Richmond Television] is negated by the authorities cited
in note 100, infra. A few preparatory decisions have capitalized pre-opening expenses
on the ground that they are an integral part of the total cost of such assets. See, e.g.,
Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 2-i I ( 1959), acquie.rced in, 1960-1 C. B. 5. But where such
expenses, if incurred after the venture is in full flower, would be deductible, deductibility during the developmental period should be allowed. D. Joseph St. Germain, 18
TCM 355 (1959); cf. Suckow Borax Mines Consol., Inc., 12 TCM 786 (1958);
Dixie Frosted Foods, 6 TCM 586 ( 1917). See generally Ellentuck, Tax Aspects of
Organizing and OJ,erating Hotels and Motel.r, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 887,
900 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ellentuck).
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PREPARATORY TO ENGAGING IN A TRADE OR BUSINESS
The status of pre-operating activities was litigated in the late 1920's
and early 1930's under the net operating loss provisions of the early
Revenue Acts. These provisions required that in order for a loss carry
forward to be deductible against business income it must result from the
"operation of a trade or businss regularly carried on by the taxpayer." "·'
The Board of Tax Appeals held in Harrisburg Hospital, Inc. 55 that a
taxpayer which constructed a hospital during the two tax years in which
losses arose and did not receive income until the completion of construction in the following year, was not actually engaged in carrying on a
trade or business, but was merely making preparations to do so. The
Board followed Harrisburg Hospital in cases where a taxpayer during
the loss years had been constructing an office building that was not ready
for occupancy until the following year,"" and where a taxpayer acquired
land and prepared for subdivision and marketing but made no sales
before the close of the loss yearY The Board also followed Harrisburg
Hospital in determining that the development stage of a mine prior to
producing status did not constitute a trade or business regularly carried
on. 58 Only the office building decision, 379 Madison A(!en11e, Inc.,""
was appealed. The Second Circuit there reversed the Board of Tax
Appeals on the grounds that the corporate taxpayer, by improving real
estate, negotiating leases, and incurring ground rents, interest and taxes,
was regularly carrying on its business for which it was chartered, even
though that business was not yet at full flower. 60
After this brief flurry, the next significant development, not considering Dep11ty 11. DuPont, 61 was the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald
11. Commissioner.""
In McDonald, the Court denied deductibility of
campaign expenses of a state court judge serving an interim appoint·
ment who was seeking election for a full term, on the grounds that they
" 4 Revenue Act of 1921, §204(a), 42 Stat. 227. See l.R.C. of 1939, §122(d)(5);
Revenue Act of 1939, § 211(b), 53 Stat. 862.
"" 15 B.T.A. 1011, 1018 (1929).
" 6 379 Madison Avenue, Inc., 23 B.T.A. 29, 44 (1931 ), rerld, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1932).
57 Birdneck Realty Corp., 25 B.T.A. 1084 (1932), acquiesced in, Xl-1 C.B. 2.
r;s New Quincy Mining Co., 36 B.T.A. 376 ( 193 7).
" 9 379 Madison Avenue, Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1932).
60 Id. However, the precedential value of 379 Madison A11enue may have been eroded
by Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), for 379 Madison Ar,enue relied upon
decisions such as Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107 ( 1911), dealing with
whether certain corporations came within provisions levying an excise tax on corporations
"carrying on or doing business." Higgins held, however, that such cases were not controlling as to whether the taxpayer, an individual, was carrying on a business under the
predecessor to section 162. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the distinction lies
between individual and corporate taxpayers, with Flint 11. Stone Tracy possessing continuing vitality as to corporate taxpayers under section 162.
61 See note 28 supra.
62 323 u.s. 57 ( 1944).
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were not "incurred in being a judge but in trying to be a judge for the
next ten years." '"' Therefore, the Court concluded, the expenses were
not incurred in his business of judging. The Supreme Court also relied
heavily, however, upon the powerful considerations of public policy involved in permitting the deductibility of campaign expenses for public
office. 6 '1 Some, but not many, of the ~ubsequent decisions on activities
preparatory to engaging in a trade or business read the above quotation
from McDonald as supporting the conclusion that expenses incurred in
preparation for entering a trade or business were not deductible, i.e., they
apparently read the Supreme Court as reasoning that until elected to a
full term, McDonald was not engaged in the business of being a judge,
and thus, the campaign expenses were incurred in preparation of such
business. 6 " In so doing, they overlooked the preceding sentence: "He
could, that is, deduct all expenses that related to the discharge of his
functions as a judge." 66 In short, the taxpayer in McDonald was engaged
in the business of being a judge, but the campaign expenses were not ordinary and necessary expenses of that business since they had no relation
to the performance of judicial duties.'' 7 Most of the campaign expense
progeny of McDonald either relied upon that rationale, public policy, 68 or
the theory that campaign expenses were personal. 110 Indeed, it has
been noted that the McDonald briefs framed the issue in terms of public
policy.' 0 Thus, McDonald properly should have no impact upon either
the investigatory or pre-operating expense issues.
The first investigatory expense decision was the 1947 Tax Court
opinion in George C. W e.rtervelt. 71 That case denied the taxpayer any
deduction for traveling expenses incurred on trips to collect data, investigate lands and cattle breeding methods, seek a foundation herd,
and acquire bulls. The court, without citing McDo11ald or the prior
net operating loss decisions, held that the taxpayer was not yet engaged
in carrying on a cattle business. "The trips were preparatory to entering
Id. at 60.
James B. Carey, 56 T.C 477, 480 (1971), acquiesced in, 1971-2 CB. 2, alf'd fJer
curiam, 460 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert. dmied, 409 U.S. 990 ( 1972).
65 See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
John F. Koons, 35 T.C 1092, 1102 (1961); Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511, 514 (1953);
Myron E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557, 560 ( 1967). Compare Horace E. Nichols, 60 T.C 236
(1973) (dissenting opinion) (running for office does not constitute trade or business,
but expenses are deductible under section 212 absent public policy considerations). See
generally Wilberding, note 16 supra at 230; Fleischer, note 35 supra at 570.
66 See note 62 supra, at 60.
6 7 See Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.), ce1·t. denied, 345 U.S. 969 (1953);
James B. Carey, 56 T.C 477, 481 ( 1971) (Tannewald, J.). But see Horace E. Nichols,
60 T.C 236 (1973) (Tannewald, ].).
6 8 See Maness v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 918, 919 (M.D. Fla. 1965), alf'd on
other grounds, 367 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1966); Horace E. Nichols, 60 T.C. 236 (1973).
69 See Mays v. Bowers, 201 F.2d 401, 403 (4th Cir. 1953).
70 James B. Carey, 56 T.C 477,488 n.2 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
71 8 T.C. 1248, 1254 ( 1947). See generally Fleischer, note 35 supra at 568-69.
63
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the cattle business." : 2 WeJtervelt was followed in 1953 by several "preparatory" decisions n decided before the House proposals for the 1954
Code, all of which involved investigatory expenses. The same was
true of the frequently cited preparatory expenses cases, such as Frank B.
Polachek 74 and Hemy G. Owei1, 7 " decided later in 1954. The only
rationale offered in any of these opinions, other than the mere conclusion
that the expenses were in preparation for a potential business, was that
they were incurred in order to maintain or acquire an asset that would
produce future income and, hence, were capital expenditures.' 6 Moreover, this was the reasoning of Mid-State Prod11ctJ Co., 77 the only decision during this period which applied the preparatory expense doctrine
to the pre-operating expenses of a taxpayer who had made a firm decision
to enter a business which was not yet productive. As pointed out in
the prior discussion, in view of the then existing state of the law, Congress could not possibly have intended in 1954 to incorporate into the
term "trade or business" a well-settled pre-operating expense doctrine
which turned on whether the taxpayer was yet holding himself out to
others as providing goods or services.
For the rest of the decade, with minor exceptions, 78 the preparatory
concept was judicially applied only to investigatory expenditures and
expenses of seeking a new job. Then, in the early sixties, the doctrine
began to be raised frequently in two areas where the taxpayer's activities
had progressed beyond the investigatory stage: farm or hobby loss decisions 7n and R & 0 cases. 80 The courts at first did not appear aware
that there was any distinction between investigatory and pre-operating
expenses, but, particularly in the farm loss area, articulated the rationale
72 8 T.C. at 1254.
73 Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C. 332, 343 (1953), aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955);
Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511,514 (1953).
7·1 22 T.C. 858, 863 (1954) (taxpayer merely had plans for a potential business; the
plans never materialized and were still in a formative stage when abandoned). See
Allan Cunningham, 22 T.C. 906, 911 ( 1954).
7" 23 T.C. 377, 381 (1954) (expenses preparatory to resumption of business and,
therefore, foundation for future income); accord, Raymond L. Collier, 13 TCM 857
(1954) (overruled by Primuth).
76 Henry G. Owen, 23 T.C. 377, 381 ( 1954); accord, James M. Osborne, 3 T.C. 603,
605 (1944). See Frederick A. Purdy, 12 T.C. 888, 893 (1949). The Tax Court in
Robert S. Seese, 7 T.C. 925, 927 ( 1946), described as preparatory certain clearly personal expenses, which it disallowed as such. Cf. Vincent W. Eckel, 33 TCM 147, 155
( 1974). Indeed, one commentator has suggested that many of the investigatory expense
decisions are explainable as a reaction to deductions claimed for dubious expenses.
Note, lnz•eJtigation Costs: An Analysis and a Proposal. IJ1 TEMPLE L. Q. 81 (1967).
77 21 T.C. 696,714-17 (1954). See note 36 sufJra.
78 Cohn v. United States, 57-1 USTC \[9457 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), aff'd 011 other
grounds, 259 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958) (relied upon erroneous definition of capital
expenditure as non-recurring).
79Edwin H. Miner, 21 TCM 1173 (1962); accord, Proebstle v. United States, 65-2
USTC \[9497 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Edward R. Godfrey, 22 TCM 1 ( 1963), aff' d on other
grounds, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), cerl. denied, 379 U.S. 966 (1966).
so E.g., John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092 ( 1961).
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that preparatory expenditures constituted capital expenditures because
"[t]hey were analogous to the amassing of the capital assets such as
the plant and machinery of a manufacturing business, preparatory to the
actual beginning of business operations." 81 Against this background the
Fourth Circuit decided the landmark pre-operating expense decision,
Richmond Television Corporation z·. United States/" over 10 years after
the enactment of the 1954 Code.
At issue in that case was the deductibility of the costs incurred prior
to receipt of an FCC license in training a staff to operate a television
station. The Government argued on brief that the expenditures had to be
capitalized because (a) they created a reservoir of skills necessary for
television broadcasting that would extend beyond the year paid, and
(b) they would contribute to the production of income over a number
of years so that charging them off against the income of a single year
would result in a gross distortion of that year's income. 83 The taxpayer
countered with the argument that there is no legal requirement that expenses must produce income in the year that they are incurred. In addition, it raised the pre-operating expense issue itself by challenging the
Government to produce a case or ruling that denied the deduction of
start-up costs. 84 The Fourth Circuit, while holding in the alternative, as
the Government had argued, that the expenditures were capital because
they constituted the cost of acquiring an asset benefiting the taxpayer
for more than one year, took up that challenge. It stated that the precise
question was the deductibility of "pre-opening" expenses incurred between the decision to establish a business and the actual beginning of
business operations (although in fact this had not been the "precise
question" argued by the Government) .85 Noting that there was little
81 Edwin H. Miner, 21 TCM 1173, 1177 ( 1962). This analysis has been expressly
rejected, however, by subsequent decisions due to the "special" farm tax accounting
rules. See Maple v. Comm'r, 140 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1971); Whitman v.
United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 851 (W.D. La. 1965) (suggests Miner erroneous).
8 2 345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Cir.), t:acated and remanded per curiam on other
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965).
83 Brief for Appellant at 11-12, Richmond Television Corp., supra note 53. The
Government did not rely upon any preparatory argument. See Solomon, Tax Treatment
of Pre-opening Expenses, 46 TAXES 521, 523 n.12 (1968), [hereinafter cited as
Solomon}.
8 4 Brief for Appellee at 9, 13, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d
901 (4th Cir. 1965).
8 5 The Government had stated the questions as follows:
"I. Whether the sums
expended in training prospective employees of a television station prior to the station's
receipt of a construction permit and broadcast license are capital expenditures. 2.
Whether, for tax purposes, the useful life of a television broadcast license issued by
the Federal Communications Commission is of indefinite duration." Brief for Appellant
at 2, Richmond Television, supra note 53. Similarly, the Solicitor General, in arguing
against the grant of certiorari, focused on the capital expenditure argument and referred
merely in passing and then in only two sentences to the pre-operating expense holding
of the court below. Memorandum for the United States in Opposition, at 3, Richmond
Television Corp. v. United States, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965). Moreover, on remand, the
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discussion in the case law as to when, in point of time, a trade or business begins, the court turned to (a) one of the transitional investigatory
pre-operating expense decisions, 86 (b) a number of cases dealing with
acquisition of a television broadcasting license, only one of which, Petersbllrg Teluision Corp., involved when a business began, while the others
turned on whether expenditures incurred in connection with procurement
of an FCC television license were capital expenditures," 7 and (c) Cohn
11. United State.r a pre-operating expense decision, which rested in part
on an erroneous definition of capital expenditures."" The Fourth Circuit
summarized its survey with the following frequently cited statement:
The uniform teaching of these several cases is that, even though
a taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter into business and over
a considerable period of time spent money in preparation for entering that business, he still has not "engaged in carrying on any trade
or business" within the intendment of section I62(a) until such
time as the business has begun to function as a going concern and
performed those activities for which it was organized. 8 "

Without debating the accuracy of the survey, it may be noted that Richmond Telui.rion was one of the first preparatory decisions to refer to the
Dep11ty 11 • D11Pont definition of trade or business as "holding one's self
out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services." "0 In addition, the Fourth Circuit appears to have deliberately ignored the reliance
by both the taxpayer and the district court below "' upon Treasury
Regulation section 1.248-1 (a) ( 3), which provides that a corporation
is deemed to have begun business as soon as its activities have advanced
to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its business operations.""
Fourth Circuit itself described its prior holding solely in terms of its alternative capital
asset holding. "For the reasons therein stated we reaffirm our holding that this sum is
not a deductible business expense for the two years in question within the meaning of
section 162(a). The expenditures in the advance training of a body of personnel created
a capital asset, requiring different tax treatment." Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 3 5'1 F.2d -110, 'l 11 (-1th Cir. 1965).
s,; Frank B. Polachek, 22 T.C. 858 ( 195'1). Polachek is transitional in that while the
taxpayer was planning a new business investment advisory service, which was never
formally organized, his solicitation of potential initial clients was similar to the solicitation he would have carried on after the business became productive.
s1 KWTX Broadcasting Co., 31 T.C. 952 ( 1959), aff' d fJer curiam, 272 F.2d -106
(5th Cir. 1959) ; Radio Station WBIR, 31 T.C. 803 ( 1959); Petersburg Television
Corp., 20 TCM 271 (1961 ).
ss 57-1 USTC 1!9·157 (W.D. Tenn. 1957), afl'd oil olher grorwd.r. 259 F.2d 371
(6th Cir. 1958). See note 78 supra.
sn 3-15 F.2d 901, 907. The Fourth Circuit's analysis IS ably criticised in Solomon .
.ruf11'a note 83, at 523-28.
no 308 U.S. -198, 1199 ( 1940).
"'Brief for Appellee at 15, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2J
901 (4th Cir. 1965); Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 66-2 USTC 1]9589
(E.D. Va. 1963).
"'See also Treas. Reg.§ l.l371-l(c)(2)(ii).
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The major developments in the preparatory doctrine after Richmond
Television have been many:
( 1) Employees have come to be regarded as being engaged in a trade
or business that is broader than their particular job. The result is that
an employee's expenses of investigating a job or position similar to the
one currently or recently held are deductible on the ground that they are
incidental to his existing trade or business rather than being preparatory
to entering a new job." 3 This concept may also be seen in the 1967 shift
in the educational expense regulations. There the Treasury has abandoned the former "new position" nondeductibility test in favor of nar·
rowing the nondeductible category of education expenses to those which
would lead to qualification of the taxpayer for a new trade or business."'
( 2) A trade or business status may continue during a hiatus, so that
expenses of resuming it are not nondeductible pre-operating expenses.""
( 3) The deduction of investigatory and pre-operating expenditures
has been permitted where they can be viewed as related to another trade
or business. For instance, section 174 authorities permit deduction of
R & D expenditures connected with any trade or business (and not
just one relating to invention activities) ."n
( 4) The pre-operating expense concept of Richmond Tele11i.rion has
been rejected in more recent farm loss cases. 117
( 5) Recent decisions have begun increasingly to rely upon the holding one's self out rationale as the foundation for the pre-operating expense doctrine.ns For purposes of analysis of Snow, the latter three de93

David ]. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 ( 1970); accord, Leonard C. Black, 60 T.C. 108
(1973); Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219 (1972); Kenneth R. Kenfield, 54 T.C. 1197
(1970); Guy R. Motto, 54 T.C. 558 (1970). See Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment
of Business and Employment Investigatory ExfmJSes, 56 MINN. L. REV. 1157, 1166-67,
1172-75 ( 1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Int,estigatory Expenses).
94 Treas. Reg.§ 1.162-5(b)(3). See Lee, Command Performance: The Tax Treatment of Employer Mandated Expe~~ses, 7 RICHMOND L. REV. 1, 34-36 ( 1972).
95 See, e.g., Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 1, 6 ( 1963). The same principle is at work in
the net operating loss authorities holding that a temporary suspension of a corporation's business does not of itself constitute a failure to carry on substantially the same
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(d)-1(n) (6) example 2; Glover Packing Co. v. United
States, 328 F.2d 342, 348 (Ct. Cl. 1964); cf. Penton v. United States, 259 F.2d 536
(6th Cir. 1958). See generally Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rafferty, 27 TAX L. REv. 453, 470 n.66 ( 1972). The
hiatus situation has occurred most frequently in the context of educational expenses.
See Furner v. Comm'r, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968); John C. Ford, 56 T.C. 1300,
1304 (1971), aff'd 73-2 USTC 1!9798 ("th Cir. 1973). See J;enerally, Note, llzvestigatory Expenses, supra note 93, at 1170-71.
9 6 Best Universal Lock Co., 45 T.C. 1 ( 1965) (section 174); accord, York v.
Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958) (section 162); Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM
1277 (1973) (section 174). See generally Note, Investigatory Expenses, supra note 93,
at 1167-68.
97 See note 81 sup1·a.
98 See, e.g., Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCM 52 ( 1973); accord, Snow v. Comm'r,
-182 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), mt. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3382 (Jan. 7, 1974).
Cf. McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1961); Herbert R. Barret, 58 T.C.
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velopments are the most significant, but a broad brush decision by the
Supreme Court on basis of the meaning of the term "trade or business"
could have a ripple effect upon all of these trends as well as the over
sixty Code provisions utilizing some form of the term. The relationship
to another trade or business aspect is discussed below in Trade or Bllsi-

nes.r Statu.r of a Limited Partner.
In the farm loss area, the Government has attempted to apply a preoperating expense doctrine under the rationale that, in developing his
agricultural commodities, the taxpayer is amassing capital assets preparatory to entering the farming business. Recent farm loss decisions have
rejected this approach."" They reason that under the special farm tax
accounting rules, farmers can elect to deduct currently development expenditures (which resemble start-up or pre-operating costs in other
industries, since they are incurred before the farmer has a farm commodity available for sale, but manifest "ordinary" characteristics since
they constitute the type of expenditures that must be deducted currently
once the farm is in full operation), despite their similarity to capital
expenditures in that they may be viewed as part of the process of acquiring, i.e., growing, a capital asset or asset used in the farmer's trade or
business. 100 Therefore, any pre-operating expense doctrine based upon an
amassing of capital assets or increase in earning capacity directly conflicted with the theory permitting deduction of development expenditures. Similarly, it may be argued that pre-operating R & D expenditures
can not be capitalized under any preparatory to engaging in a trade or
business concept that is founded on an amassing of capital assets or
increase in earning power rationale. For this was the precise rationale
espoused by the decisions that section 174 was designed to overrule. 10 '
In short, where special tax accounting rules permit optional deduction of
capital expenditures, a taxpayer should not be forced to capitalize them
284 (1972) (Bruce,]., decided Snow in Tax Court); C. Fink Fisher, 50 T.C. 164, 171
( 1968) (Featherston, ]., decided Kennedy); Myron E. Cherry, 26 TCM 557, 560
( 1967). Many district court farm loss decisions illustrate the term "trade or business"
by declaring that a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business generally holds himself out
as selling either goods or services. Hicks v. United States, 72-1 USTC 1T 9383 (S.D.
Miss. 1972); Cavender v. United States, 71-2 USTC 1]'9723 (S.D. W.Va. 1971). This
broad definition has been described as "inadequate in resolving the variety of factual
situations which have faced the courts." Martin C. McGowan, 23 TCM 1439, 1442
(1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1965 ).
D9Compare Edwin H. Minor, 21 TCM 1173 (1962) and Edward R. Godfrey, 22
TCM 1 (1963 ), aff'd on other f!.round.r, 335 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1964), rert. de11ied, 379
U.S. 966 ( 1965), with Whitman v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 845, 854-55, 892.
(W.D. La. 1965). See Maple v. Comm'r, ·i40 F.2d 1055. 1056 (9th Cir. 1971). Cf.
Walter E. Edge, Jr., 32 TCM 1291, 1298 (1973) (history of losses during det;e/opmeltt period not significant).
10o Maple v. Comm'r, 440 F.2d 1055, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1971); Herbert D. Wiener,
58 T.C. 81, 88 ( 1972); Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 327-28 ( 1964).
See also United States v. Catto, 284 U.S. 102, 106 ( 1966).
101 See note 37 supra.
Tax Lawyrr, Vol. 27, No. 3

398

SECTION OF TAXATION

on the theory that they are capital expenditures, even if that theory
is dressed up as a preparatory doctrine. If that doctrine is to be applied to pre-operating R & D expenditures, it must be justified on some
other rationale, such as a requirement that a trade or business does not
commence until the taxpayer has goods or services available for sale.
And if that requirement is erroneous, then application of a preparatory
to engaging in a trade or business concept to pre-operating R & D expenditures is erroneous as well.
The genesis of the definition of trade or business as involving "holding
one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services" is
a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Deputy v. D1tPont. 102
There, however, the Supreme Court was engaged in distinguishing between trade or business expenditures and investment or "non-business"
expenditures later made deductible under the predecessor to section 212.
For example, an investor in securities, in managing his own investments,
does not provide services to another; services are rendered or goods are
sold only through the business activities of the corporation, a separate
tax entity, whose securities the investor holds. 10 " Thus be is at the end
of the investment economic chain and neither creates a market nor
provides services to anotber. 10 ' Accordingly, it is significant that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter preceded his "holding out" definition with the
observation that active concern over one's financial interest, i.e., investments, did not constitute a trade or business. By way of contrast, the preoperating enterprise ultimately will hold itself out as providing goods or
services. Indeed, there is no inherent reason why a taxpayer should not
satisfy Mr. Justice Frankfurter's definition if he has a present intent to
hold himself out at some future date when goods will be ready for sale. 10 "
The alternatives in the tax treatment of pre-operating expenses are
current deduction or capitalization. Yet the original "holding one's self
out" doctrine as promulgated in Dep11ty I'. D11Pont was not intended
to make this distinction but was intended instead to distinguish between
expenses which were deductible under the predecessor to section 162
and those which, prior to the enactment of the predecessor to section
212, were simply nondeductible. As the oft-cited decision of the Second
Circuit in Trent 11. Comm i.r.riouer points out:
302 U.S. -188,-199 (19-10) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion).
See Lee, "ActitJe Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Real
Estate Bu.rine.r.r, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 323 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lee, "ActitJe
Conduct"}.
101
See Achille 0. Van Suetendael, 3 TCM 987 (191-1), aff'd mem., 152 F.2d 651
( 2d Cir. 1915). See al.ro Saunders, "Trade or Busine.r.r," Its Meaning Under the Internal Rer,enue Code, 12 So. CAL. INST. ON FED. TAX. 693 ( 1960).
1or. Section 1.513-1 (b) of the regulations, which declares that it is following the
meaning of "trade or business" under section 162, states that generally the term
"includes any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods
or performance of services." A production of income purpose does not normally require
current income. Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-l(b). Cf. Treas. Reg.§ 1.212-1(b).
102
10 "
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Throughout the Internal Revenue Code there runs a distinction
between those expenses and losses incident to the endeavor to earn
a livelihood by "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the
selling of goods or services," Deputy v. DuPont, 1940, 308 U.S.
488, 499, 60 S. Ct. 363, 369, 84 L. Ed. 416 (concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), those incident to other activities that
are pecuniarily motivated, Higgins v. C.I.R., 1941, 312 U.S. 212,
61 S. Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783, and those incident to activities that are
not. Deductions of the first class are usually allowed fully, some of
the second and third only under limitations, and some, especially
of the third class, not at alJ.1° 6

In short, the "holding one's self out" definition was intended to distinguish between a trade or business and investment activities, and not
to determine when a trade or business had commenced. Following
Deputy 11. D11Pont faithfully, the taxpayer in the pre-operating enterprise, who as yet has no products to offer, incurs his "ordinary" expenses
for the production of income (section 212 does not require current
income) .107 Assuming, as most commentators do, that a corporation's
trade or business encompasses investment activities, 108 the only areas in
which the failure to hold one's self out would ever be determinative as
to deductibility of pre-operating expenses, if a valid prerequisite, are
those provisions which only incorporate the trade or business standard
of section 162, but not the production of income criterion of section 212,
and, then, only as to individuals. The inconsistency in permitting a
corporation to deduct its pre-operating R & D expenses while precludlor. 291 F.2d 669,670-71 (2d Cir. 1961).

Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l(b); Rev. Rul. 74-28, 1974-3 l.R.B. 7. See S. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong, 2d Sess., 87 (1942). Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511, 514 (1953).
disallowed investigating expense claimed in the alternative under the predecessor to
section 212 on the grounds that "[t)here is a basic distinction between allowing deductions for the expense of producing or collecting income, in which one has an existent
interest or right, and expenses incurred in an attempt to obtain income by the creation
of some new interest." This "existing interest" rule has been severely criticized. See
Fleischer, supra note 35, at 581-84. But in any event, the taxpayer, once he has made
the firm decision to enter a new business and taken steps towards that goal, has the
requisite existing interest in his pre-operating business so that section 212 is applicable.
Moreover, any other rule would leave a taxpayer in the non-business, non-deductibility
limbo that section 212 was designed to /ill. Finally, the Tax Court recently allowed a
deduction for a would-be author's preparatory expenses under section 212 while denying that the taxpayer was yet engaged in the trade or business of being an author.
Marian B. S. Crymes, 31 TCM 4 ( 1972).
lOS See BITIKER & STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 232 (4th
ed. 1972); BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS \[5.03, n.8 (3d ed. 1971): "During the 1942 hearings on § 212, a taxpayer representative recommended its enlargement to include corporations. The recommendation was not adopted, probably because it was thought to be unnecessary. At
any rate, it has been generally assumed since 1942 that a corporation can deduct under
§ 162(a) any expenses that could be deducted under § 212 by an individual. . . . "
But cf. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 908 (4th Cir. 1965),
tJacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965) (section 212
inapplicable to corporations).
107
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ing an individual in similar circumstances from deducting his R & D
expenses, although under section 212 he could deduct "ordinary" or
non-capital pre-operating expenses such as advertising, illustrates the
absurdity of basing the test for determining when a business commences on the moment that the taxpayer first has products or services
ready to sell.
To require a taxpayer to hold himself out to others as selling goods
or services, particularly when inventing activities are involved, is to
require in many instances an economic return to be produced currently.
If the taxpayer must have a commercially acceptable invention to offer,
he must of necessity have completed his research and experimentation
before he has entered into the trade or business at issue. Yet in the
hobby loss area, in which the issue of whether a taxpayer is engaged in a
trade or business has arisen most frequently, the cases commonly have
not expressly required the taxpayer to hold himself out to others as
currently selling goods or services, to have a product ready for sale, 10 n
or to produce an immediate economic return. 110 Furthermore, in the
context of section 17 4, "experimental activity often shows little, if
any, return during developmental stages. It was to encourage this kind
of activity that Congress authorized the current deduction of research
and experimental expenditures." 111 In summary, the "holding one's
self out to others" rationale is not a supportable basis for the preoperating expense doctrine, nor are the other justifications raised from
time to time in the cases. 11 ~
The Solicitor General, in his memorandum in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari in Snow, asserted, as had the Commissioner
in the Tax Court below, that the partnership "which had no plant, no
separate office or facility, no telephone and no marketing activity during
the year in question, did not meet the accepted definition of a 'trade or
10n See, e.g., Mercer v. Comm'r, 376 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1967); Whitman v. United
States, 248 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. La. 1968) (no sales of cattle during developmental
period); DuBose v. Ross, 66-2 USTC 1!9672 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (in growing timber
no receipts until pine trees reach a certain stage of development); Harold M. Clark,
28 TCM 1260 (1969) (no successful crop of Oregon Myrtle bushes in three successive
years, no gross income); D. Joseph St. Germain, 18 TCM 355 (1959) (tree farm, no
sales until maturity). Moreover, several decisions treat a failure to hold one's self out
as selling goods and services as merely a factor which, standing alone, might not negative any intention to engage in a business activity for profit. Joseph v. Curran, 29 TCM
696 (1970); see also American Properties, Inc., 28 T.C. 1100, 1112 (1957), aff'd per
curiam, 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958); James E. Ashe, 26 TCM 791,793 (1967).
110Eugene]. Magee, 32 TCM 1277, 1279 (1973) (section 174); accord, Margit
Sigray Bessengey, 45 T.C. 261, 274 (1965), aff'd, 379 F.2d 931 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) (leading Tax Court farm loss decision); Johan A. Louw,
30 TCM 1421 ( 1971) (section 174). See generally Note, ltwestigatory Exfmzses, supra
note 93, at 1161-62.
11 1 Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277, 1279 (1973).
112 See note 53 supra.
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business.' " 113 The Service frequently has pointed to similar facts in
asserting that a corporation was not engaged in an active trade or
business. 111 The uniform judicial response has been that a business
may be conducted through agents and the crucial question is whether
the taxpayer bears the economic risk of the activity. 115 In 1966, the
partnership in Snow paid for 500 hours of management services performed largely by its 50 percent general partner (who also had a 34 percent interest as a limited partner) . In addition the partnership paid for
substantial R & 0 services performed by a corporation that carried on
machining and fabrication shopwork.Un Thus, the partnership was
engaged in a trade or business under the above standard, through the
activities of its agents who performed the R & 0 on its behalf. Furthermore, the regulations apply section 174 to R & 0 carried out on behalf
of the taxpayer by a research institute, foundation, engineering company, or similar contractor.U' Consequently, affirmance by the Supreme
Court on this ground could provoke a flood of litigation under provisions such as sections 61, 355,482 and 921(a), where existing case
law attributes business activities of an agent to his principal.
Since Deputy 11. DuPont does not, and was never intended to, provide
guidelines as to when a trade or business commences, but only as to
whether business or investment activities are involved, guidance must
be sought elsewhere. Numerous provisions in the regulations state that
a corporation commences its business as soon as its activities have advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of its business
operations, e.g., acquisition of the necessary operating assets. 118 Thus,
113 Memorandum for Respondent in Opposition to Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at
6, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 846
(Jan. 7, 1974) (No. 73-641); Brief for Respondent at 28-29, 35, 41 Edwin A. Snow,
58 T.C. 585 ( 1972). See Brief for Appellee at 15, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029
(6th Cir. 1973).
114 Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D. Mont. 1971) (section 355
active business test is met despite absence of telephone, separate business address, and
advertising; was not held out to third persons as a separate emity) ; American Savings
Bank, 56 T.C. 828, 839 ( 1971) (similar facts not dispositive where business conducted
through agents).
1 15 See, e.g., Frank v. Int'l Canadian Corp., 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962) (section
921(2) ); United States Gypsum Co. v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill.
1969), •·ev'd on othe1· grounds, 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971) (section 921(2));
American Savings Bank, 56 T.C. 828, 839 ( 1971) (section 61); Barber-Greene Americas, Inc., 35 T.C. 365, 387-88 (1960). See generally Lee, "Acti11e Conduct", supra
note 103, at 330-31. Thus, the Commissioner's argument that "[t)he only activity
which can be characterized as 'business' was the action taken by Burns to have Crossbow,
Inc. perform the research and development work on the incinerator concept," misses the
mark. Brief for Respondent at 34-35. Edwin A. Snow, 58 T.C. 585 ( 1971).
116 58 T.C. at 590-91.
117 Treas. Reg.§ 1.174-2(a) (2).
11BE.g., Treas. Reg. §§1.248-1(a)(3) and 1.1371-1(c)(2)(ii). See Mandell,
Deductibility of Pre-Operating Expenses: Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures,
25 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1235, 1235-36, 1246 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
Mandell); Note, l!westigatory Expenses, supra note 93, at 1164 n.28. This objective
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the conduct of a restaurant business can commence in the taxable year
in which construction of the restaurant facility is undertaken or when
real property is purchased or leased for such use. 119 While the Service
has ruled that investigatory expenses in search of a campsite for a
proprietary boys' camp, and promotional expenses incurred prior to signing the lease, were preparatory capital expenditures, 1 ~ 0 it has also ruled
(possibly under the rationale that a firm decision had already been
made) that developmental planning, negotiating for financing, and
readying of property for construction constitutes being engaged in the
active conduct of a trade or business.'~' The Solicitor General argued in
opposition to the granting of a writ of certiorari in Snow that "(t]he
term 'trade or business' has a single meaning in all sections of the
Code."'~~ Logically then, the point in time when a business commences
should be determined from the same factors under all sections of the
Code. The regulations consistently look at the objective facts which
establish the character of the business and not at whether the corporate
taxpayer holds itself out to others as c11rrently providing goods or services. These factors, therefore, should be followed in all Code sections
in which the term "trade or business" appears. Under these authorities,
the partnership's inventing business in Snow had commenced in 1966.
Furthermore, the Tax Court stated that the R & D expenditures were
profit-motivated, 123 and the facts manifest sufficient continuity by the
identification approach is closely paralleled by the "commitment to the business venture"
trend in the transaction entered into for profit area, discussed in Wilberding, supra
note 16. The first explicit judicial consideration given to Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1 (a) (3)
subsequent to the opinion in Richmond Telet,ision was in an individual hobby loss
case, Justin A. McNamara, 32 TCM 11, 16 (1973 ), where the taxpayer unjustifiably
relied upon the regulation as relevant to profit motive and the court broadly dismissed
its relevance as to whether an individual has commenced a trade or business assuming
that the prerequisites of profit motive and continuity are met.
110 Treas. Reg.§§ 1.955-5(a) (3) and 1.1372-4(b) (5) (ii) (b).
1~o Rev. Rul. 73-421, 1973-42 I.R.B. 7.
1~t Rev. Rul. 72-220, 1972-1 C.B. 365.
1 ~2 Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Snow
v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973 ), cert. /!,rauted, 94 S. Ct. 846 (Jan. 7,
1974) (No. 73-641). The taxpayer pointed out to the Sixth Circuit that, in the legislative history of section 513, the provision relied upon for that statement [Cooper Tire &
Rubber Co. Employees' Retirement Fund v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 96 (1961), aff'd per
curiam, 306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962)], specifically referred to section 162 for the content of the term "trade or business." Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Snow v. Comm'r.
482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973).
1 ~~ The headnote in Edwin A. Snow, which is usually prepared by the Tax Court
judge who decides the case, states that each of the three limited partnerships was
formed to carry on R & D upon a particular invention "with a view to profit." Prior to
1970 a corporation was organized to produce and market the leaf burner invention of
Burns. 58 T.C. at 591. Neither the Tax Court nor the Sixth Circuit opinion discloses
whether the invention was licensed by the partnership to the corporation or transferred
to it in a tax-free exchange. If the latter, and the taxpayer had always intended an
incorporation of the invention when perfected (to deflect ordinary income to a lowerbracket taxpayer), he would have had no intent to realize a direct profit from operation
of the invention. However, profit for this purpose encompasses unrealized appreciation
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 27, No. 3
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partnership through its agent to satisfy the traditional trade or business
criteria. It is well established that sustained and profit-motivated inventive activities constitute a trade or business, separate and apart from the
business of commercially exploiting an invention.'~' In short, the partnership was engaged in the trade or business of inventing with which the
claimed R & D expenses were connected.

TRADE OR BUSINESS STATUS OF A LIMITED PARTNER
The taxpayer in Snou• argued in the Tax Court that he actively participated in the R & D and overall management of all three partnerships and (a) that as a member of such partnerships, he held developed
products for sale or licensing, and (b) by virtue of his participation in
such partnerships, he was engaged in the business of developing and
obtaining patents on new products for commercial exploitation. 125 The
Tax Court acknowledged that an individual may be engaged in a business by .being a partner in such business, but it apparently concluded
that the first two partnerships had not progressed into a trade or business status because there were no sales or evidence of efforts to sell
(but cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (-1) ), and presumably the value of the stock in the
new corporation would reflect the value of the invention, and, if in excess of the taxpayer's R & D write-offs, would satisfy the profit-motive test under sections 162, 212
and 183. Yet if the taxpayer's intention had always been to ultimately possess valuable
appreciated stock in a corporation owning the leaf burner invention, the Service could
have argued that the claimed R & D expenditure constituted the "acquisition cost" of
such stock and therefore a capital expenditure. Cf. George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688.
697-98 ( 1969), alf'd, ·120 F.2d 'l90 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally Allington, Farming
as a Tax Shelter. 1·1 S.D. L. REV. 181, 202-05 (1969); Young. The Role of Motir•e in
Er•aluating Tax Sheltered lnr•estments, 22 TAx LAWYER 275, 283-8 1i (1968).
In Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCJ\.f 53, 55 ( 1973). Judge Featherston similarlr
reasoned that a shareholder's "pre-opening expenditures were incurred in creating a
business which would ultimately produce inrome taxable to Riverside (his subsequently
formed corporation) after incorporation. These expenditures, therefore. should be
treated as contributions to the capital of Riverside and reflected in the basis of the
corporation's stock." Assuming that this is a valid approach. the Court would have to
remand Snow to determine whether the taxpayer (and possibly a majority in interest of
the other partners as well) had an intent from the beginning to incorporate, so that it
may be reasoned that he incurred the R & D expenditures to acquire the stock. On the
one hand, it is clear that the taxpayer or the limited partnership had sophisticated
advance tax planning, e.g.; in practical effect there was a special allocation of the
R & D deductions to the "moneymen" limited partners since initial losses were allocated according to contributed cash capital with a charge back of income, see Treas.
Reg.§ 1.701-1(b) (2) (example 5). Thus. the taxpayer, a four percent limited partner.
was allocated 25 percent of the R & D deductions in 1966. 58 T.C. at 590-91. On the
other hand, the taxpayer was only a four percent limited partner. The general partner
who had an 8·1 percent interest in the partnership. probably had the determinative say
on such matters.
12·1 Johan A. Louw, 30 TCM 1121 (1971); accord, Eugene J. Magee, 32 TCM 1277
( 1973).
'""Reply brief for Petitioners at 12-13, Brief for Petitioners at 29-30, Edwin A.
Snow, 58 T.C. 585 ( 1972).
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their inventions in 1966.'"" The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand,
shifted ground and concluded that the taxpayer's management and advisory activities as to the three partnerships were not sufficiently continuous or regular to constitute carrying on a trade or business. 127 It
further relied upon Whipple u. Commissioner '" 8 as precluding the taxpayer from being engaged in a trade or business as an investor in
inventions.
The shortcomings in the Sixth Circuit's reasoning are numerous.
Under its equation of "holding one's self out" with "having a product to
offer," the first two partnerships were probably engaged in the trade or
business of developing inventions. Some decisions hold that a partner,
including a limited partner, is engaged in the trade or business of his
partnership because its activities are carried out on his behalf, and,
. therefore, imputed to him. ' 2 " This principle would distinguish W hippie,
which in essence rests on the doctrine that a corporation and its shareholders are distinct tax entities and a shareholder is not engaged in the
trade or business of his corporation. The Tax Court so held in A. L.
Stanchfield.' 30 Thus, the taxpayer was arguably engaged in the invention
business carried on by the first two partnerships. Furthermore, R & D
expenditures for a new product, such as the trash burner developed by
the third partnership, may be deducted as incurred in connection with
the trade or business of developing other inventions or products. Consequently, the taxpayer's argument that he individually was engaged in a
trade or business deserved better consideration than the Sixth Circuit's
W hippie analysis.
This line of argument does, however, raise two further significant
issues: ( 1) is a partnership's trade or business status imputed to the
partners, or does partnership profit or loss merely maintain the same
trade or business status for tax return purposes in the partner's hands as
it had in the hands of the partnership, and ( 2) assuming that a partner
has obtained trade or business status either through attribution from
another partnership, or independently through his own individual activi58 T.C. 585, 596 ( 1972). The Tax Court apparently ignored its own finding
that in 1966 the products of the other two partnerships had been developed to the stage
of being ready for sale, that the partners hoped to license some manufacturers to build
and market them, and that a patent on one of the products was filed in 1966. Id. at 588.
Furthermore, the Government did not disallow the 1966 R & D expenses of the other
two partnerships. Id. at 592.
12; 482 F.2d 1029, 1033 ( 1973).
1 2 8 373 u.s. 193 (1963).
129 Harding v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1953); George A. Butler,
36 T.C. 1097, 1106 ( 1961) (limited partner); Darwin 0. Nichols, 29 T.C. 1140,
1145 ( 1958); Nate Kazdin, 28 TCM 432 ( 1969). See gmerally Lee, "Active Co11duct,"
supra note 103, at 322. But see Young, l11come Tax Co11seque11ces of l1111estment Losses
of Individuals, 27 TAX L. REV. 1, 26-28 ( 1971).
130 24 TCM 1681 ( 1965). See gmerally Lee, "Actiz1e Co11duct," supra note 103, at
323.
.
12 6
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ties, does this status affect the character of his distributive share of
partnership income or loss which, in the hands of his partnership or in
the hands of another partner, would not be incurred or earned in a
trade or business? The answers to these two inquiries have consequences
in contexts other than section 174. For example, a question has currently been raised whether profit motive for purposes of section 183 is
determined at the partnership or partner level.'"' If the former, would
a partner's motive override that of his partnership? Commentators have
also frequently discussed whether a taxpayer who is a dealer, for example, in real estate may obtain capital gains treatment for a sale by a
non-dealer partnership in which he is a partner.m These issues m
essence turn on the competing "entity" and "aggregate" theories of
partnership taxation, which the Supreme Court recently declined to
address in Basye.'""
The question is usually stated as whether character of income is to be
determined at the partnership or partner level. Section 702 (b) provides that the character of income or loss included in a partner's distributive share of such income or loss which he reports separately in his
individual return shall be determined "as if such item were realized
directly from the source from which realized by the partnership, or
incurred in the same manner as incurred by the partnership." Unfortunately, this ambiguous language does not meet the source of the
problem; namely, whether for this purpose, the partnership is to be
treated as an "entity" or an "aggregate" of individual partners. If the
former, character would be determined at the partnership level and continue into the individual partner's hands under the transmission or
"conduit" approach of section 702 (b). If the latter, character would
be determined as if the partner realized the item directly, apart from
the partnership. While the "aggregate" theory is also referred to as
the "conduit" approach, use of the latter term is confusing since it also
refers to the transmission of the taxpaying obligation to the individual
partners. 134 Thus, to say as the Supreme Court recently did in United
States v. Basye that "partnerships are entities for purposes of calculating and filing informational returns, but that they are conduits through
which the taxpaying obligation passes to the individual partners in
1 31 See, e.g., Prospectus, DLJ PROPERTIES/73, 46 (Oct. 18, 1973) ("Although the
Internal Revenue has never indicated that section 183 is applicable to limited partners,
it is conceivable that it may take such a position notwithstanding any 'profit objective'
which the partnership may be deemed to have"). Cf. Valentine Howell, 41 T.C. 13,
17,19 (1963) aff'd, 332 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1964).
132 See, e.g., Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Partnership lncome"E,Itity" v. "Conduit" Principle i11 Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAx. 287, 292 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Wolfman).
1 33 United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
1 34 Wolfman, supra note 132, at 289-92.
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accord with their distributive shares" 135 does not signify at which level
character of income or trade or business status is to be determined.
As noted above, a hypothetical often posed by commentators is that
of a real estate dealer who is a partner in a partnership that would qualify
for capital gains treatment if character were determined solely at the
partnership level. Under the entity theory, the partner would have capital gain; but under the aggregate theory, he has ordinary income. The
legislative history to section 702 (b) is somewhat contradictory, but on
the whole, appears to adopt an aggregate approach.""; The General
Explanation in the Committee reports takes the entity approach, stating
that "items required to be segregated will retain their original character
in the hands of the partner as though they were realized directly by him
from the same source from which realized by the partnership and in the
same manner." m The Technical Explanation, on the other hand,
seems to take an aggregate approach, stating that " [ s Jubsection (b)
contains a 'conduit' rule which makes clear that the character of any
item realized by the partnership and included in a partner's distributive
share shall be the same as though he had realized .wch item directly,
1·ather than thro11gh his membership in a partnership, from the source
from which it was realized by the partnership and in the same manner." 1 ~" Counterbalancing this expression of the Congressional intent
is the fact that section 702 (a) speaks of the partner's distributive share
of "the partmr.rhip' s" various items of gain or loss, and subsection (b)
refers to the character of the items listed in subsection (a). A partnership could have items of gain or loss only under an entity theory. 139
The regulations seem to determine character at the partnership level,
with such income or loss retaining the same character in the hands of
the partner_,..o Moreover, on occasion the Service has expressly announced that character of an item of income or loss is determined at the
" " tj I 0 U.S. tjtj I, 118 n.8 ( 1973). In text accompanying the footnote, the Court
explained that:
[W]hile the partnership itself pays no taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 701, it must report
the income it generates and such income must be calculated in largely the
same manner as an individual computes his personal income. For this purpose,
then, the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart
from the aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be disregarded since each partner must pay a tax on a
portion of the total income as if the partnership were merely an agent or
conduit through which the income passed.
1 "" Anderson &
Coffee, ProfJosed Ret,i.rion of Partnet· and PartnershifJ Taxation:

Anttlysi.r of the RefJort of the Adt,isory GroufJ

011

SubchafJter K (First Installment),

5 TAx. L. REV. 285, 29 I ( 1960) [hereinafter cited as Anderson & Coffee); Wolfman,
.ruf'r<l note 132 at 291.
107
H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1951) (emphasis added); accord,
S. REP. No. I 622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 89 ( 195·1).
'""H. R. REP. No. 1337, S3d Cong., 2d Sess., A222 (1951) (emphasis added);
aCtwd, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 377-78 (1951).
139 Anderson & Coffee, .rufJra note 136, at 291; Wolfman, supra note 132, at 291.
140 Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (b).
I
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partnership level, w and in litigation has argued for that result where a
partner, if realizing a gain directly, would be entitled to capital gains
treatment. 142 But it appears that the Government argues for the aggregate theory as well, where to do so is to its temporary advantage. 143 This
may well be part of the reason why the matter was still being discussed
in 1972 before the Supreme Court in Basye.w A number of recent
decisions, relying upon language in section 702 (a) referring to the
"partnership's" gains or losses, have determined character of income at
the partnership level, where the partnership was a dealer in the property sold but the taxpayer partner was not and the issue was whether to
allow the partner capital gains treatment. 145
Under the entity approach, in order for the taxpayer in Snow to deduct his distributive share of the R & D incurred by the third partnership
on its trash burner, the partnership would have to be engaged in the
trade or business of inventing in 1966. Under the aggregate theory by
itself, the taxpayer would probably not be able to deduct the R & D
since both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit held that his individual
activities did not qualify as a trade or business. While the Government
has usually argued for the entity approach to section 702 (b), it may
advocate before the Supreme Court in Snow adoption of an aggregate
approach. The Solicitor General's memorandum in opposition to the
petition for a writ of certiorari in Snow raised the following arguments:
During the year in question, the partnership, in which petitioner
was merely an investor, was not holding itself out to others as
engaged in the selling of goods and services .
. . . Thus, the aim of section 17 4 was to equalize the treatment of
small business vis-a-vis large businesses and not, as petitioner asserts
(Pet. 9-12), to extend the deduction to mere investors who cannot
meet the "trade or business" qualification.H 6
The description of investor hardly fits the partnership, and as applied
to the limited partner, is relevant only under an aggregate approach. The
Government's Brief in the Sixth Circuit manifests that its investment
intent argument rests on determination of trade or business status at the
partner level. The Commissioner asserted there that the vehicle of a
partnership "permitted the limited partners to engage in private investments while strictly limiting their liability, thus avoiding the risks cusRev. Rul. 68·79, 1968-1 C.B. 310; Rev. Rul. 67-188, 1967-1 C.B. 216.
See, e.g., Barham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 43, 45, 46 (M.D. Ga. 1969),
aff'd mem., 429 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970); Hyman Podell, 55 T.C. 429, 432-33 (1970).
lH See note 147 infra.
14
• See note 135 supra.
145 See note 142 supra.
146 Memorandum for Respondent in Opposition in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
ti-5, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. };ranted, 94 S. Ct 846 (Jan.
7, 1974) (No. 73-641).
Hl

142
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tomarily attendant to trade or business activities." 7 Thus, the Government was implicitly arguing for the aggregate approach.
Many decisions under the 1939 and 1954 Codes impute partnership
business activities to the partners, including limited partners, so that
they are engaged in the same business as their partnership. Hs The rationale is that a partnership acts only on behalf of the partners, and
that trade or business activities of an agent are imputed to his principal
in determining the latter's business.''" The Advisory Group on Subchapter K viewed the imputation doctrine as a corollary to the aggregate
approach, stating in 195 7 that:
].1

Although the character of the income items is to be determined at
the partner level, account must be taken of the fact that the partnership is acting for the partners and thus that they are engaged in
whatever business the partnership is. Thus, where there is a sale
of property being used in a trade or business at the level of the
partnership . . . the partnership character of any gain from such a
sale would be attributed to the partners since they individually would
be considered as engaged in the partnership business.t" 0
Under the aggregate-imputation approach it could be argued that the
taxpayer in Snow was engaged in the business of inventing through imputation from the first two limited partnerships, which had inventions
ready to offer for licensing or sale in 1966, and thus his distributive
share of the third partnership's R & D losses would be deductible by him
under the aggregate approach to section 702 (b). While the Tax Court
held in George A. B11tler "" that a limited partner was engaged in the
trade or business conducted by his partnership, a commentator has
concluded that B11tler would not seem to support a rule that a partner is
always engaged in the trade or business of his partnership. 152 Since the
imputation concept is not derived directly from section 702, but is based
upon the principle that a taxpayer may conduct a business solely through
activities of an agent, whether a partner is engaged in the business of
his partnership should be resolved on the basis of analogy to principles
of agency law. If a partner, general or limited, exercises sufficient conBrief for Appellee at 14-15, Snow v. Comm'r, 482 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1973).
1939 Code: Flood v. United States, 133 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1943); Harding v.
United States, 113 F. Supp. 462 (Ct. Cl. 1953); George A. Butler, 36 T.C. 1097
(1961) (limited partner). 1954 Code: Nate Kazdin, 28 TCM 432 (1969); see
A. L. Stanchfield, 24 TCM 1681 (1965). But cf. Boone v. United States, 74-1 USTC
1[9180 (D.N. Dak. 1973).
140 ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER K OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF
1954, REVISED REPORT ON PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS 7·8 ( 1957) (hereinafter
cited as Advisory Group). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A (1957).
Cf. Inez de Amodio, 34 T.C. 894, 902 (1960), alf'd, 299 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962).
150 Advisory Group, supra note 149.
151 36T.C.1097, 1106 (1961).
152 Young, Income Tax Consequences of Investment Losses of Individuals, 27 TAX
l. REV. 1, 26-7 (1971).
147

148

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 27, No. 3

409

WILL SNOW FALL?

trol over the partnership, or has such authority that it acts as his agent,
then the partnership business activities should be imputed to the partner
in determining whether he is engaged in the trade or business conducted by the partnership. 153 The reported facts do not disclose whether
the taxpayer in Snow exercised such control over the first two partnerships
or had the right to do so. Furthermore, his interests in these two partnerships appear to have been only that of a trustee.
It is submitted that the "entity" approach should apply here, and that
the imputation theory is inconsistent with the entity approach. Viewing
the partnership as a separate entity with character of income determined at the partnership level and under the conduit approach such
character together with the tax liability being transmitted to the partner,
the trade or business of the partqership should not be imputed to the
partner, just as a corporation's business as a separate entity is not
imputed to its shareholders. Under this approach, the Sixth Circuit's
reliance upon lf/hippie was not erroneous, but there is no indication
that the appellate court was even aware of the entity versus aggregate
issue. Should the aggregate approach prevail, however, as to characterization of income under section 704, then the imputation doctrine should
apply as well. For if a partnership is only an aggregate of individuals for
this purpose, it in effect acts only on their behalf and is their agent.
Therefore, determining trade or business status at the partner level,
the premise of the Commissioner's investment arguments in Snow, requires consideration of the imputation theory as well. Only the Supreme
Court or Congress can now resolve whether the "entity" or "aggregate"
approach is to apply here. The legislative history, a slight majority of
commentators, and the imputation cases militate towards the aggregate
approach. But the language of section 702 (a) and the recent decisions
relying on that language hold for an entity approach. The Government
has blown both hot and cold for the entity approach, albeit heretofore
usually hot.
TAX SHELTER MOTIVE
The Sixth Circuit in Snow noted that the taxpayer had income in
1966 in excess of $200,000, so that his investment in the partnership
was made as a high bracket taxpayer. It then concluded that two laudable public purposes were therefore in direct conflict: ( 1) stimulation
of R & D by inventors and small businessmen, and ( 2) "the desirability
of strict interpretation of tax laws so as to prevent unintended tax shelters." 15 '1 As shown in the preceding sections, not just strict, but
erroneous interpretation as well of section 174 is necessary to support the
1 53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§§ 2(1), 14, 220(2) (1957).
v. United States, 329 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1964).
154 482 F.2d 1031.
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result reached in Snow. The Government's arguments to the Fourth
Circuit in Richmond T elel'iJion were more explicit. There it asserted
that the expenses at issue were not expected to produce income in the
years incurred and that to charge them off (through net operating loss
deductions) against the income of a single year would result in a gross
distortion of that year's income.w· The Fourth Circuit accepted this
argument as the basis for its alternative capitalization holding. 156 The
Government did not seem bothered by the fact that capitalization of preoperating expenses frequently results, as was the case in Richmond T eleviJion, in equal distortion of income. There, deduction or amortization
of such capitalized expenditure was deferred indefinitely, and in many
instances capitalized start-up costs would be amortized at best over a long
duration unrelated to the period in which they produced income.
It appears clear from Richmond TeleuiJion and Snow that the desire
to match deductions with related future expected income underlies the
Government's attack on pre-operating or start-up costs. 157 The goal
appears laudable: a tax shelter deduction, or "accelerated deduction" in
the terminology of the Administration's 1973 proposals for tax reform,
consists of "a deduction which clearly relates to some future expected
profit and has little or no relation to income reported in the current
year." 158 But there is currently no overt tax principle that requires a
matching of related income and deductions, and the remedy of capitaliza155 Brief for Appellant at 13, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d
901 (4th Cir. 1965).
156 Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.),
11acated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965).
1 5 7 The same policy apparently underlies recent threatened application of the "profit
motive" test to tax shelters. See Remarks by the Honorable Donald C. Alexander,
27 TAx LAWYER 173 (1974). Indeed, the Service often asserts alternative preparatory and hobby loss contentions. See, e.g., Edwin H. Miner, 21 TCM 1173 (1962).
158 Administration's Proposals for Tax Change with Treasury Explanation 96-97
( 1973) (hereinafter cited as Proposals for Tax Change]. Technically, the Limitation
on Artificial Accounting Loss ( "LAL") proposals define an "accelerated deduction"
as a deduction relating to future expected profit, but unrelated to current income. An
"artificial accounting loss" is defined as the amount by which accelerated deductions
exceed "associated net related income" for the taxable year, computed without regard
to the accelerated deductions. Id. at 97. Since accelerated deductions are allowed up
to the amount of net related income, the latter becomes a pivotal term. Feinschreiber,
1973 Tax Reform: The Administration's Proposals, 51 TAXES 398, 399 (1973). In
disfavored tax shelters it is limited to income from the particular investment or business property that is generating the accelerated deduction. For instance, related income
for non-residential or commercial real estate includes only the rental income from the
particular property to which the accelerated deductions, such as accelerated depreciation,
are attributable. Proposals for Tax Change, supra at 99. On the other hand in favored
tax shelters such as residential real estate or oil and gas drilling, related income includes rental income from all residential real estate and mineral income from oil and
gas properties, respectively. Id. at 98-99. The device by which accelerated deductions
are matched with their related income is the Deferred Loss Account ( "DLA"). An
artificial accounting loss, or accelerated deduction in excess of net related income, is
deferred by adding it to the DLA, to be taken as a deduction (and subtracted from the
DLA) against the first net related income in subsequent tax years or to be taken into
account upon a sale or other disposition of the property. ld. at 97. This differs from
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tion, advocated by the Government in Snow and Richmond Television,
frequently does not achieve equitable results.
The tax treatment of advertising expenditures perhaps best illustrates
that income and deductions need not be matched under current law.
"[C]urrent deductibility has normally been permitted for advertising
expenditures and for educational expenditures to improve one's skills
utilized in existing employment, even though there were indications
that some general benefit would in all probability last beyond the year of
expenditure."' 1 "n Early decisions held that advertising and promotional
expenditures could not be charged to future years either as deferred
charges, or by amortization of capital investment, where the taxpayer
failed to show that the future benefits could be determined precisely
and were not of indefinite duration. 11' 0 Subsequent cases concluded that
since advertising expenses could not be capitalized in such circumstances
and spread over future years, they were properly deducted currently. 101
Recently the Tax Court in Briarcliff Candy Corp. 16 " turned back to the
earlier authority, ignoring the intervening development, to hold that advertising expenditures which would ordinarily be currently deducted
must be capitalized when made for the cultivation or development of
future business. This has been the usual rationale under which the
Government has sought to capitalize start-up costs. The Second Circuit
reversed the Tax Court, reasoning that under the Supreme Court's decision in Commi.rsioner z·. Lincoln Saz:i11g.r and Loan As.r'n/ 6 " the
presence of benefits which will be realized in future years is not controlling; " 'many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect
beyond the taxable year." " 164
The inappropriateness of capitalization of start-up costs may be seen
in Richmond T elui.rion, where the taxpayer was permanently deprived
capitalization in that the deduction is not taken ratably over the life of the asset producing the accelerated deduction, but is instead deferred completely until net income
is generated and then offsets such income in full. The closer analogue would be the
net operating loss carryover under section 172 (b) (I) (B). without the five year
limitation.
!GO David J. Primuth, 5·1 T.C. 37·'1. 382 (1970) (concurring opinion); E. H. She).
don & Co. v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. 195 1i); Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc.,
25 T.C. -163, 467 (1955); Consolidated Apparel Co., 17 T.C. 1570, 1582 (1952).
aff'd, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953); Elmer W. Conti, 31 TCM 3-18 (1972); Stanley
Selig, 26 TCM 1302 ( 1967).
16°See, e.,;., A Finkenberg's Sons, Inc., 17 T.C. 973,983 (1951); X-Pando Corp.,
7 T.C. -18, 53 ( 1946); F. E. Booth Co., 21 B.T.A. HB, 150· 52 ( 1930); Colonial Ice
Cream Co., 7 B.T.A. 15-1, 156 ( 1927). Cf. Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6 B.T.A. 12·17,
1253·5-1 (1927), alf'd, 29 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1928); Northwestern Yeast Co., 5 B.T.A.
232, 237·38 (1926).
1 6 1 Carey Mach. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Hofferber!, 50-2 USTC ~ 9 i21
(D. Md.
1950); see E. H. Sheldon & Co. v. Comm'r, 21-1 F.2d 655. 659 (6th Cir. 1954);
Harper & Mcintire Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 588, 589 (D. Iowa 1957).
162 31 TCM 171, 176 (1972), rerld, 1 i75 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
16 3 ·103 u.s. 345 ( 1971).
IG-1 tl75 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit also scored the Tax
Court decision for its unjust and unequal interpretation of the law in permitting retailTax lAw)'rr, Vol. 27, No. 3
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of the benefits of using such costs in its annual tax equation because
they were added to the basis of its FCC television license which lacked a
reasonably ascertainable useful life. 1 " 5 Thus it was left only with an
increased cost basis, usable when and if ultimately disposed of the
business or lost the license. Similarly, taxpayers are frequently forced
to add start-up costs to their stock basis in the corporation which ultimately operates the business. 166 Distortion of income can arise as well
when pre-operating expenses connected with an apartment project, such
as advertising for initial tenants and management expenses during this
period, are capitalized since they would probably be spread over the
useful life of the apartment buildings. 167
In addition to the lack of a sound conceptual framework for capitalization of pre-operating expenses and the inappropriateness of capitalization itself to match income and expenses, attacking tax shelters through
pre-operating expense glosses on the term "trade or business" can only
lead to disturbing and probably unintended side effects throughout the
tax law in all of the areas noted previously in which preparatory contentions have surfaced in the past: job-seeking expenses, 168 educational
expenses/ 69 farm losses, 110 start-up costs/ 71 R & 0 expenditures, 112 and
ers to deduct advertising and promotional expenses, but denying similar tax treatment
to a wholesaler whose customers are retailers. 475 F.2d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1973). A
similar case of discriminatory tax treatment between established and beginning businesses
would arise under Snow.
165 See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965).
Surely the majority of those employees trained in 1952 through 1956 were not still
employed in 1974, but at the date of this writing Richmond Television Corporation
still has its FCC license and broadcasts without being permitted to amortize or deduct
one cent of its employee training expense incurred twenty years ago. Frequently,
"preparatory" or investigatory expenses are attributable to assets without limited lives
and hence cannot be amortized. Mandell, supra note 118, at 1238.
tao Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCM 52, 55 ( 1973); see Dwight A. Ward, 20 T.C.
332 (1953), acquiesced in, 1956·1 C.B. 6, aff'd, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955); Roy L.
Harding, 29 TCM 789 ( 1970). See generally Comment, The Deductibility of Pre·
Incorporation Expenses, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 463 ( 1970). The inequity of such increase in basis has been judicially noted. See Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557,
568 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Cleophus L. Kennedy, 32 TCM 52, 55 (1973), which noted that
some pre-opening expenditures were for assets which subsequently formed corporation
could depreciate.
,
167 Cf. Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 241 (1959). See generally Hamovit, Construction
Period Expenses, 29 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1075 ( 1971); Ellen tuck, supra
note 53, at 899. A "developer" with multiple projects would, however, under the
York rationale be able to deduct such pre-opening expenses. See Dean, Tax Considera·
tions and Problems of the Deve/oper-Bui/de,·, 26 N.Y.U. TNST. ON FED. TAx. 209
(1968); Ellentuck, supra note 53, at 899.
168 See note 93 supra.
169 See note 94 supra.
110 See note 81 supra.
111 See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir. 1965),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 ( 1965); Cleophus L. Kennedy,
32 TCM 52, 55 (1973). But see 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1932).
1 ' 2 See, e.g., John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 1092, 1100 (1961). See note 2 supra.
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the active business requirement of section 3 55.' ;a The effect of a narrow definition by the Supreme Court in Snow of "trade or business,''
excluding a pre-operating business could be enormous in these areas,
some of which have only recently arrived at new resolutions of the preparatory to engaging in a trade or business arguments of the Government.
It is clear that section 174 was in part intended to help small businesses without established research departments, but it may be argued
that such intent would not extend to instances where there is no business at all except for the R & D. In such circumstances, allowance of a
current deduction under section 174 permits a taxpayer to shelter
unrelated income and thereby defer payment of income taxes on such
income until some later date when the process or invention produces
income that is fully taxed because deduction of the related R & D expenditures, which would otherwise offset such income, instead had been
accelerated to prior years. Yet it appears that Congress contemplated
that taxpayers could offset R & D expenditures against substantial income
from other sources and that a temporary loss of revenue (the deferred
taxes) would result. Representative Camp's comments on the ABA
prototype to section 174 pointed out that
[ m Jerely providing for deductibility of such expenditures probably
would be satisfactory to most large businesses. However, a small
business which has unusually large expenditures in connection with
a research program, or a new or beginning business enterprise,
must be allowed the right to capitalize such costs and recover them
by amortization deductions over the estimated useful life, in order
to insure equality of treatment with large businesses which can
and usually do deduct the full amounts of such expenditures from
current income. . . . [I]t is provided that the taxpayer may
designate the period over which the capitalized costs of a specific research project or undertaking shall be amortized. Any temporary
loss of revenue resulting from a taxpayer's selection of an unreasonably short amortization period will ordinarily be recovered in
later years when no amortization deduction will be allowableY"
Representative Camp appears to have visualized that large corporations would benefit principally from current deduction of R & D against
unrelated income. But the interest free loan m arising from the deferral
of taxes through deducting R & D expenses against current unrelated
income rather than future related income from the invention was just
as valuable, for example, to the corporate taxpayer in Best Universal
H3 Spheeris v. Comm'r, 461 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972). See f!.enerally Lee. Functional Dit,isions and Other ·Corporate SeJJarations Under Secti011 355 After Rafferty,
27 TAX L. REV. 453,469-471 (1972).
174

97 CONG. REc. A4326 (1951) (Appendix).

See Calkins & Updegraft, Jr., Tax Shelters, 26 TAX
Proposals for Tax Change, supra note 158, at 16, 95.
175
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Lock Co. 176 as it would have been to the individual taxpayer in Snow.
While the Tax Court thought that the business of the corporation in
Best Universal Lock Co. included experimentation and efforts to develop new products as well as manufacturing locks, the Service clearly
did not so limit the decision in Revenue Ruling 71-162 Y 7 If a corporation which is carrying on inventing activities that are not yet producing income can offset current unrelated income with its R & D expenditures, then an individual's or partnership's R & D activities which are
profit-motivated and sufficiently regular and continuous should qualify
as a "trade or business" as well so that expenditures in connection with
such activities would be deductible under section 174 against unrelated
income.
The narrow construction by the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit in
Snow of the term "trade or business" would make current deduction by
an as yet unsuccessful bona fide full-time inventor difficult, if not impossible. Yet the legislative history to section 183, enacted in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, manifests an intent that a bona fide inventor be
entitled to a current deduction even though his expectation of profit
might be unreasonable.m Under current section 174 the part or fulltime individual inventor, the corporate inventor, and the inventing
partnership with investor limited partners should all be treated equally
as to offsetting R & D expenditures against unrelated income. All are
equally undeserving of interest-free loans from the Government in the
form of deferral of taxes. If Congress resolves to distinguish between
these classes of taxpayers, it could easily do so by limiting the current
deduction privilege to taxpayers with limited amounts of unrelated noninventing income. Section 1251 constitutes a close analogy. There Congress reacted to the similar problem of use of accelerated farm deductions against non-farm income by providing for a limited recapture of
otherwise capital gains farm gain as ordinary income if an individual
had offset substantial amounts of farm losses against high bracket nonfarm income.
Representative Camp in 1951, and presumably Congress in 1954,
were not unaware of the "temporary" loss of revenue inherent in current
deduction of R & D expenditures. However, Congress does not appear
to have been as conscious in 1954 of the permanent loss of revenues from
"loss interest" during the period taxes are deferred through "artificial
accounting losses," i.e., accelerated deductions which offset current unrelated income.m It is submitted that such revenue loss should be curbed
15 T.C. I, 9-10 (1965).
Rev. Rul. 71-Hi2, 1971-1 C.B. 97.
17
H S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1969).
See Treas. Reg.
1.183-2(c) (example 6) (although no income yet realized, several patents obtained
and extensive efforts to "market" inventions).
17!J Proposals for Tax Change, note 15R W/Jra, at 96-97.
171;
1 77

*
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regardless of the class of taxpayer involved, but capitalization of preoperating expenses, including R & D before an invention is commercially acceptable, is neither conceptually justifiable nor the appropriate
means to accomplish that goal. Either an overall limitation on artificial
accounting losses as proposed by the Administration in 197 3 180 or a
mandatory capitalization of all pre-operating expenses with the right
to then amortize them over some fixed period, such as sixty months,
should be enacted. Both section 17 4 and the current narrow section
248 amortization of corporate organizational expenses 181 offer a pattern
for the latter approach. Unless the Supreme Court decides to fashion
a requirement that start-up costs are to be deferred until their related
income is produced and are then deductible against such income as
earned, which is not the same as capitalizing them, it should reverse
Snow.
CONCLUSION
The demand for reform of the current treatment afforded tax shelters
through limiting the deduction of accelerated deductions against unrelated income 182 has been growing. Undoubtedly the tax administrators,
and possibly the courts as well, are feeling the pressure to curtail such
deductions within the existing tax structure. Apparently, the areas in
which the Service has determined to seek such limitations are section 18 3,
which disallows, not capitalizes, deductions claimed in an activity that
is not engaged in for profit, and the preparatory stages to engaging in a
trade or business concept. Section 183 is an awkward tool for this task
since "profit," which excludes a mere intent to reduce taxes, encompasses
a bona fide intent to achieve an ultimate economic profit in addition to
tax savings. Similarly, the term "trade or business' together with the
remedy of capitalization of "ordinary" pre-operating expenses are inappropriate to defer the deduction of accelerated expenses until the related
income is realized. But if Congress does not act quickly with respect to
accelerated deductions, the courts may be sorely tempted to use these approaches to match expenses and income, however roughly and inequitably. Unfortunately, any precedents thus created would undoubtedly
See note 158 supra.
One commentator has suggested that all corporate pre-opening expenses should
be treated as organizational expenses under section 248. Carruthers, Jr., How to Treat
the Expenses of Organization, Reorf!,anization and Liquidation, 24 N.Y.U. lNST. ON
FED. TAx. I 055, 1062 ( 1966). While equitable and as a policy matter possibly the
approach that should be legislatively adopted, this argument ignores the narrow
definition of organizational expenditures promulgated in the regulations. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (2). Pre-opening expenditures might come closer to the statutory
language of section 248 (b), but query whether they are incident to the creation of
the corporation. In any event the regulations faithfully track the Committee Print
Technical Explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A64 (1954).
182 See note 158 supra.
18o

181
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be extended to situations in which there was no tax shelter intent. 183
Conversely, the tax collector should be aware that implementation of
make-shift judicial remedies will probably lessen the pressure for true
and equitable reform by Congress.
18~ See Spheeris v. Comm'r, '161 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972) (denial of section 355
on preparatory theory).
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